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Abstract
We study n-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the
players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion
of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a
refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also study
natural variants of SPE, named weak (resp. very weak) SPE, where players who deviate
cannot use the full class of strategies but only a subclass with a finite number of (resp. a
unique) deviation step(s).
Our results are threefold. Firstly, we characterize in the form of a Folk theorem the set
of all plays that are the outcome of a weak SPE. We also establish a weaker version of this
theorem for SPEs. Secondly, for the class of quantitative reachability games, we prove the
existence of a finite-memory SPE and provide an algorithm for computing it (only existence
was known with no information regarding the memory). Moreover, we show that the existence
of a constrained SPE, i.e. an SPE such that each player pays a cost less than a given constant,
can be decided. The proofs rely on our Folk theorem for weak SPEs (which coincide with
SPEs in the case of quantitative reachability games) and on the decidability of MSO logic on
infinite words. Finally with similar techniques, we provide a second general class of games for
which the existence of a (constrained) weak SPE is decidable.
1998 ACM Subject Classification B.6.3 [design aids]: automatic synthesis; F.1.2 [Modes of
computation]: interactive and reactive computation
Keywords and phrases multi-player games on graphs, quantitative objectives, Nash equilib-
rium, subgame perfect equilibrium, quantitative reachability
1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum infinite duration games played on graphs are a mathematical model
used to formalize several important problems in computer science. Reactive system synthesis
is one such important problem. In this context, see e.g. [13], the vertices and the edges of the
graph represent the states and the transitions of the system; one player models the system
to synthesize, and the other player models the (uncontrollable) environment of the system.
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2 Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Games
In the classical setting, the objectives of the two players are opposite, i.e. the environment is
adversarial. Modeling the environment as fully adversarial is usually a bold abstraction of
reality and there are recent works that consider the more general setting of non zero-sum
games which allow to take into account the different objectives of each player. In this latter
setting the environment has its own objective which is most often not the negation of the
objective of the system. The concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [11] is central to the study of
non zero-sum games and can be applied to the general setting of n player games. A strategy
profile is a NE if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his strategy, since he
cannot strictly improve on the outcome of the strategy profile by changing his strategy only.
However in the context of sequential games (such as games played on graphs), it is
well-known that NEs present a serious weakness: a NE allows for non-credible threats that
rational players should not carry out [15]. As a consequence, for sequential games, the notion
of NE has been strengthened into the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE): a strategy
profile is an SPE if it is a NE in all the subgames of the original game. While the notion
of SPE is rather well understood for finite state game graphs with ω-regular objectives or
for games in finite extensive form (finite game trees), less is known for game graphs with
quantitative objectives in which players encounter costs that they want to minimize, like
in classical quantitative objectives such as mean-payoff, discounted sum, or quantitative
reachability.
Several natural and important questions arise for such games: Can we decide the existence
of an SPE, and more generally the constrained existence of an SPE (i.e. an SPE in which
each player encounters a cost less than some fixed value)? Can we compute such SPEs
that use finite-memory strategies only? Whereas several work has studied what are the
hypotheses to impose on games in a way to guarantee the existence of an SPE, the previous
algorithmic questions are still widely open. In this article, we provide progresses in the
understanding of the notion of SPE. We first establish Folk theorems that characterize the
possible outcomes of SPEs in quantitative games for SPEs and their variants. We then
derive from this characterization interesting algorithms and information on the strategies
for two important classes of quantitative games. Our contributions are detailed in the next
paragraph.
Contributions First, we formalize a notion of deviation step from a strategy profile
that allows us to define two natural variants of NEs. While a NE must be resistant to the
unilateral deviation of one player for any number of deviation steps, a weak (resp. very weak)
NE must be resistant to the unilateral deviation of one player for any finite number of (resp.
a unique) deviation step(s). Then we use those variants to define the corresponding notions
of weak and very weak SPE. The latter notion is very close to the one-step deviation property
[12]. Any very weak SPE is also a weak SPE, and there are games for which there exists a
weak SPE but no SPE. Also, for games with upper-semicontinuous cost functions and for
games played on finite game trees, the three notions are equivalent.
Second, we characterize in the form of a Folk theorem all the possible outcomes of weak
SPEs. The characterization is obtained starting from all possible plays of the game and
the application of a nonincreasing operator that removes plays that cannot be outcome of
a weak SPE. We show that the limit of the nonincreasing chain of sets always exists and
contains exactly all the possible outcomes of weak SPEs. Furthermore, we show how for each
such outcome, we can associate a strategy profile that generates it and which is a weak SPE.
Using a variant of the techniques developed for weak SPEs, we also obtain a weaker version
of this Folk theorem for SPEs.
Additionally, to illustrate the potential of our Folk theorem, we show how it can be
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refined and used to answer open questions about two classes of quantitative games. The first
class of games that we consider are quantitative reachability games, such that each player
aims at reaching his own set of target states as soon as possible. As the cost functions
in those games are continuous, our Folk theorem characterizes precisely the outcomes of
SPEs and not only weak SPEs. In [1, 6], it has been shown that quantitative reachability
games always have SPEs. The proof provided for this theorem is non constructive since it
relies on topological arguments. Here, we strengthen this existential result by proving that
there always exists, not only an SPE but, a finite-memory SPE. Furthermore, we provide an
algorithm to construct such a finite memory SPE. This algorithm is based on a constructive
version of our Folk Theorem for the class of quantitative reachability games: we show that
the nonincreasing chain of sets of potential outcomes stabilizes after a finite number of steps
and that each intermediate set is an ω-regular set that can be effectively described using
MSO sentences. The second class of games that we consider is the class of games with cost
functions that are prefix-independent, whose range of values is finite, and for which each
value has an ω-regular pre-image. For this general class of games, with similar techniques as
for quantitative reachability games, we show how to construct an effective representation of
all possible outcomes compatible with a weak SPE, and consequently that the existence of a
weak SPE is decidable. In those two applications, we show that our construction also allow
us to answer the question of existence of a constrained (weak) SPE, i.e. a (weak) SPE in
which players pays a cost which is bounded by a given value.
Related work The concept of SPE has been first introduced and studied by the game
theory community. The notion of SPE has been first introduced by Kuhn in finite extensive
form games [9]. For such games, backward induction can be used to prove that there always
exist an SPE. By inspecting the backward induction proof, it is not difficult to realize that
the notion of very weak SPE and SPE are equivalent in this context.
SPEs for infinite trees defined as the unfolding of finite graphs with qualitative, i.e.
win-lose, ω-regular objectives, have been studied by Ummels in [18]: it is proved that such
games always have an SPE, and that the existence of a constrained SPE is decidable.
In [8], Klimos et al. provide an effective representation of the outcomes of NEs in
concurrent priced games by constructing a Bu¨chi automaton accepting precisely the language
of outcomes of all NEs satisfying a bound vector. The existence of NEs in quantitative games
played on graphs is studied in [2]; it is shown that for a large class of games, there always
exists a finite-memory NE. This result is extended in [3] for two-player games and secure
equilibria (a refinement of NEs); additionally the constrained existence problem for secure
equilibria is also shown decidable for a large range of cost functions. None of these references
consider SPEs.
In [5], the authors prove that for quantitative games with cost functions that are upper-
semicontinus and with finite range, there always exits an SPE. This result also relies on a
nonincreasing chain of sets of possible outcomes of SPEs. The main differences with our
work is that we obtain a Folk theorem that characterize all possible outcomes of weak SPEs
with no restriction on the cost functions. Moreover we have shown that our Folk theorem
can be made effective for two classes of quantitative games of interest. Effectiveness issues
are not considered in [5]. Prior to this work, Mertens shows in [10] that if the cost functions
are bounded and Borel measurable then there always exists an -NE. In [6], Fudenberg et al.
show that if the cost functions are all continous, then there always exists an SPE. Those
works were recently extended in [14] by Le Roux and Pauly.
Organization of the article In Section 2, we present the notions of quantitative game,
classical NE and SPE, and their variants. In Section 3, we propose and prove our Folk
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Theorems for weak SPEs and for SPEs. In Section 4, we provide an algorithm for computing
a finite-memory SPE for quantitative reachability games, and a second algorithm to decide
the constrained existence of an SPE for this class of games. In Section 5, we show that the
existence of a (constrained) weak SPE is decidable for another class of games. A conclusion
and future work are given in the last section.
2 Preliminaries and Variants of Equilibria
In this section, we recall the notions of quantitative game, Nash equilibrium, and subgame
perfect equilibrium. We also introduce variants of Nash and subgame perfect equilibria, and
compare them with the classical notions.
2.1 Quantitative Games
We consider multi-player turn-based non zero-sum quantitative games in which, for each
infinite play, players pay a cost that they want to minimize.1
I Definition 1. A quantitative game is a tuple G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, λ¯) where:
Π is a finite set of players,
V is a finite set of vertices,
(Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V such that Vi is the set of vertices controlled by player i ∈ Π,
E ⊆ V ×V is a set of edges, such that2 for all v ∈ V , there exists v′ ∈ V with (v, v′) ∈ E,
λ¯ = (λi)i∈Π is a cost function such that λi : V ω → R ∪ {+∞} is player i cost function.
A play of G is an infinite sequence ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω such that (ρi, ρi+1) ∈ E for all i ∈ N.
Histories of G are finite sequences h = h0 . . . hn ∈ V + defined in the same way. The length
|h| of h is the number n of its edges. We denote by First(h) (resp. Last(h)) the first vertex
h0 (resp. last vertex hn) of h. Usually histories are non-empty, but in specific situations it
will be useful to consider the empty history . The set of all histories (ended by a vertex
in Vi) is denoted by Hist (by Histi). A prefix (resp. suffix) of a play ρ is a finite sequence
ρ0 . . . ρn (resp. infinite sequence ρnρn+1 . . .) denoted by ρ≤n or ρ<n+1 (resp. ρ≥n). We use
notation h < ρ when a history h is prefix of a play ρ. Given two distinct plays ρ and ρ′, their
longest common prefix is denoted by ρ̂ρ′.
When an initial vertex v0 ∈ V is fixed, we call (G, v0) an initialized quantitative game. A
play (resp. a history) of (G, v0) is a play (resp. history) of G starting in v0. The set of histories
h ∈ Hist (resp. h ∈ Histi) with First(h) = v0 is denoted by Hist(v0) (resp. Histi(v0)). In the
figures of this article, we will often unravel the graph of the game (G, v0) from the initial
vertex v0, which ends up in an infinite tree.
Given a play ρ ∈ V ω, its cost is given by λ¯(ρ) = (λi(ρ))i∈Π. In this article, we are
particularly interested in quantitative reachability games in which λi(ρ) is equal to the
number of edges to reach a given set of vertices.
I Definition 2. A quantitative reachability game is a quantitative game G such that the cost
function λ¯ : V ω → (N ∪ {+∞})Π is defined as follows. Each player i has a target set Ti ⊆ V ,
and for each play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . of G, the cost λi(ρ) is the least index n such that ρn ∈ Ti if it
exists, and +∞ otherwise.
1 Alternatively, players could receive a payoff that they want to maximize.
2 Each vertex has at least one outgoing edge.
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Notice that the cost function λ¯ of a quantitative game is often defined from |Π|-uples of
weights labeling the edges of the game. For instance, in inf games, λi(ρ) is equal to the
infimum of player i weights seen along ρ. Some other classical examples are liminf, limsup,
mean-payoff, and discounted sum games [4]. In case of quantitative reachability on graphs
with weighted edges, the cost λi(ρ) for player i is replaced by the sum of the weights seen
along ρ until his target set is reached. We do not consider this extension here. Notice that
when weights are positive integers, replacing each edge with cost c by a path of length c
composed of c new edges allows to recover Definition 2.
Let us recall the notions of prefix-independent, continuous, and lower- (resp. upper-)
semicontinuous cost functions. Since V is endowed with the discrete topology, and thus V ω
with the product topology, a sequence of plays (ρn)n∈N converges to a play ρ = limn→∞ ρn
if every prefix of ρ is prefix of all ρn except, possibly, of finitely many of them.
I Definition 3. Let λi be a player i cost function. Then
λi is prefix-independent if λi(hρ) = λi(ρ) for any history h and play ρ.
λi is continuous if whenever limn→∞ ρn = ρ, then limn→∞ λi(ρn) = λi(ρ).
λi upper-semicontinuous (resp. lower-semicontinuous) if whenever limn→∞ ρn = ρ, then
lim supn→∞ λi(ρn) ≤ λi(ρ) (resp. lim infn→∞ λi(ρn) ≥ λi(ρ)).
For instance, the cost functions used in liminf and mean-payoff games are prefix-independent,
contrarily to the case of inf games. Clearly, if λi is continuous, then it is upper- and lower-
semicontinuous. For instance, the cost functions of liminf and mean-payoff games are neither
upper-semicontinuous nor lower-semicontinuous, whereas cost functions of discounted sum
games are continuous. The cost functions λi, i ∈ Π, used in quantitative reachability games
can be transformed into continuous ones as follows [1]: λ′i(ρ) = 1− 1λi(ρ)+1 if λi(ρ) < +∞,
and λ′i(ρ) = 1 otherwise.
2.2 Strategies and Deviations
A strategy σ for player i ∈ Π is a function σ : Histi → V assigning to each history3 hv ∈ Histi
a vertex v′ = σ(hv) such that (v, v′) ∈ E. In an initialized game (G, v0), σ is restricted to
histories starting with v0. A player i strategy σ is positional if it only depends on the last
vertex of the history, i.e. σ(hv) = σ(v) for all hv ∈ Histi. It is a finite-memory strategy if it
needs only finite memory of the history (recorded by a finite strategy automaton, also called
a Moore machine). A play ρ is consistent with a player i strategy σ if ρk+1 = σ(ρ≤k) for all k
such that ρk ∈ Vi. A strategy profile of G is a tuple σ¯ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies, where each σi is
a player i strategy. It is called positional (resp. finite-memory) if all σi, i ∈ Π, are positional
(resp. finite-memory). Given an initial vertex v0, such a strategy profile determines a unique
play of (G, v0) that is consistent with all the strategies. This play is called the outcome of σ¯
and is denoted by 〈σ¯〉v0 .
Given σi a player i strategy, we say that player i deviates from σi if he does not stick
to σi and prefers to use another strategy σ
′
i. Let σ¯ be a strategy profile. When all players
stick to their strategy σi except player i that shifts to σ
′
i, we denote by (σ′i, σ−i) the derived
strategy profile, and by 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 its outcome in (G, v0). In the next definition, we introduce
the notion of deviation step of a strategy σ′i from a given strategy profile σ¯.
3 In this article we often write a history in the form hv with v ∈ V to emphasize that v is the last
vertex of this history.
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I Definition 4. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game, σ¯ be a strategy profile, and σ′i be a player
i strategy. We say that σ′i has a hv-deviation step from σ¯ for some history hv ∈ Histi(v0)
with v ∈ Vi, if
hv < 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 and σi(hv) 6= σ′i(hv).
Notice that the previous definition requires that hv is a prefix of the outcome 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 ; it
says nothing about σ′i outside of this outcome. A strategy σ
′
i can have a finite or an infinite
number of deviation steps in the sense of Definition 4. A strategy with three deviation
steps is depicted in Figure 1 (left) such that each hkvk-deviation step from σ¯, 1 ≤ k ≤ 3, is
highlighted with a dashed edge. We will come back to this figure later on.
v0
v1
v′1
v2
v′2
v3
v′3
〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0
h1
h2
h3
v0
v1
h1 ·〈σ¯h1〉v1=〈σ¯〉v0
v′1
v2
h2 ·〈σ¯h2〉v2 = h1v1 ·〈σ¯h1v1〉v′1
v′2
v3
h3 ·〈σ¯h3〉v3 = h2v2 ·〈σ¯h2v2〉v′2
v′3
〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 = h3v3 ·〈σ¯h3v3〉v′3
h1
h2
h3
Figure 1 A strategy σ′i with a finite number of deviation steps.
In light of Definition 4, we introduce the following classes of strategies.
I Definition 5. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game, and σ¯ be a strategy profile.
A strategy σ′i is finitely deviating from σ¯ if it has a finite number of deviation steps from
σ¯.
It is one-shot deviating from σ¯ if it has a v0-deviation step from σ¯, and no other deviation
step.
In other words, a strategy σ′i is finitely deviating from σ¯ if there exists a history hv <
〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 such that for all h′v′, hv ≤ h′v′ < 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 , we have σ′i(h′v′) = σi(h′v′) (σ′i acts
as σi from hv along 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0). The strategy σ′i is one-shot deviating from σ¯ if it differs
from σi at the initial vertex v0, and after v0 acts as σi along 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 . As for Definition 4,
the previous definition says nothing about σ′i outside of 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 . Clearly any one-shot
deviating strategy is finitely deviating. The strategy of Figure 1 is finitely deviating but not
one-shot deviating.
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2.3 Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria, and Variants
In this paper, we focus on subgame perfect equilibria and their variants. Let us first recall
the classical notion of Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile σ¯ in an initialized game is a Nash
equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his strategy, since he
cannot strictly decrease his cost when using any other strategy.
I Definition 6. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile σ¯ = (σi)i∈Π of (G, v0)
is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for all players i ∈ Π, for all player i strategies σ′i, we have
λi(〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0) ≥ λi(〈σ¯〉v0).
We say that a player i strategy σ′i is a profitable deviation for i w.r.t. σ¯ if λi(〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0) <
λi(〈σ¯〉v0). Therefore σ¯ is a NE if no player has a profitable deviation w.r.t. σ¯.
Let us propose the next variants of NE.
I Definition 7. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game. A strategy profile σ¯ is a weak NE (resp.
very weak NE ) in (G, v0) if, for each player i ∈ Π, for each finitely deviating (resp. one-shot
deviating) strategy σ′i of player i, we have λi(〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0) ≥ λi(〈σ¯〉v0).
I Example 8. Consider the two-player quantitative game depicted in Figure 2. Circle (resp.
square) vertices are player 1 (resp. player 2) vertices. The edges are labeled by couples of
weights such that weights (0, 0) are not specified. For each player i, the cost λi(ρ) of a play
ρ is the weight of its ending loop. In this simple game, each player i have two positional
strategies that are respectively denoted by σi and σ
′
i (see Figure 2).
v0
v1 v2
v3 v4
σ1 σ′1
(3, 3) σ2 σ
′
2
(3, 4) (1, 3)
Figure 2 A simple two-player quantitative game
The strategy profile (σ1, σ′2) is not a NE since σ′1 is a profitable deviation for player 1
w.r.t. (σ1, σ′2) (player 1 pays cost 1 instead of cost 3). This strategy profile is neither a weak
NE nor a very weak NE because in this simple game, player 1 can only deviate from σ1 by
using the one-shot deviating strategy σ′1. On the contrary, the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a
NE with outcome v0v
ω
1 of cost (3, 3). It is also a weak NE and a very weak NE.
By definition, any NE is a weak NE, and any weak NE is a very weak NE. The contrary
is false: in the previous example, (σ′1, σ2) is a very weak NE, but not a weak NE. We will see
later an example of game with a weak NE that is not an NE (see Example 12).
The notion of subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinment of NE. In order to define it, we
need to introduce the following notions. Given a quantitative game G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, λ¯)
and a history h of G, we denote by Gh the game Gh = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π, E, λ¯h) where
λ¯h(ρ) = λ¯(hρ)
8 Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Games
for any play of Gh4, and we say that Gh is a subgame of G. Given an initialized game (G, v0),
and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), the initialized game (Gh, v) is called the subgame of (G, v0)
with history hv. Notice that (G, v0) can be seen as a subgame of itself with history hv0 such
that h = . Given a player i strategy σ in (G, v0), we define the strategy σh in (Gh, v) as
σh(h′) = σ(hh′) for all histories h′ ∈ Histi(v). Given a strategy profile σ¯ = (σi)i∈Π, we use
notation σ¯h for (σih)i∈Π, and 〈σ¯h〉v is its outcome in the subgame (Gh, v).
We can now recall the classical notion of subgame perfect equilibrium: it is a strategy
profile in an initialized game that induces a NE in each of its subgames. In particular, a
subgame perfect equilibrium is a NE.
I Definition 9. Given an initialized game (G, v0), a strategy profile σ¯ of (G, v0) is a subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) if σ¯h is a NE in (Gh, v), for every history hv ∈ Hist(v0).
As for NE, we propose the next variants of SPE.
I Definition 10. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game. A strategy profile σ¯ is a weak SPE
(resp. very weak SPE ) if σ¯h is a weak NE (resp. very weak NE) in (Gh, v), for all histories
hv ∈ Hist(v0).
I Example 11. We come back to the game depicted in Figure 2. We have seen before
that the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a NE. However it is not an SPE. Indeed consider the
subgame (Gv0 , v2) of (G, v0) with history v0v2. In this subgame, σ′2 is a profitable deviation
for player 2. One can easily verify that the strategy profile (σ′1, σ′2) is an SPE, as well as a
weak SPE and a very weak SPE, due to the simple form of the game.
The previous example is too simple to show the differences between classical SPEs and
their variants. The next example presents a game with a (very) weak SPE but no SPE.
I Example 12. Consider the initialized two-player game (G, v0) in Figure 3. The edges are
labeled by couples of weights, and for each player i the cost λi(ρ) of a play ρ is the unique
weight seen in its ending cycle. With this definition, λi(ρ) can also be seen as either the
mean-payoff, or the liminf, or the limsup, of the weights of ρ. It is known that this game has
no SPE [16].
Let us show that the positional strategy profile σ¯ depicted with thick edges is a very
weak SPE. Due to the simple form of the game, only two cases are to be treated. Consider
the subgame (Gh, v0) with h ∈ (v0v1)∗, and the one-shot deviating strategy σ′1 of player 1
such that σ′1(v0) = v2. Then 〈σ¯h〉v0 = v0v1vω3 and 〈σ′1, σ2h〉v0 = v0vω2 , showing that σ′1 is
not a profitable deviation for player 1. One also checks that in the subgame (Gh, v1) with
h ∈ (v0v1)∗v0, the one-shot deviating strategy σ′2 of player 2 such that σ′2(v1) = v0 is not
profitable for him.
Similarly, one can prove that σ¯ is a weak SPE (see also Proposition 13 hereafter). Notice
that σ¯ is not an SPE. Indeed the strategy σ′2 such that σ
′
2(hv1) = v0 for all h, is a profitable
deviation for player 2 in (G, v0). This strategy is (of course) not finitely deviating. Finally
notice that σ¯ is a weak NE that is not an NE.
From Definition 10, any SPE is a weak SPE, and any weak SPE is a very weak SPE. The
next proposition states that weak SPE and very weak SPE are equivalent notions, but this is
no longer true for SPE and weak SPE as shown previously by Example 12.
4 In this article, we will always use notation λ¯(hρ) instead of λ¯h(ρ).
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v0 v1v2 v3
(2, 0)
(0, 0)
(2, 0)
(0, 0)
(1, 2) (0, 1)
Figure 3 A two-player game with a (very) weak SPE and no SPE. For each player, the cost of a
play is his unique weight seen in the ending cycle.
I Proposition 13. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game, and σ¯ be a strategy profile. Then σ¯
is a weak SPE iff σ¯ is a very weak SPE.
There exists an initialized game (G, v0) with a weak SPE but no SPE.
Before proving this proposition, we would like to come back to the definition of deviation
step (Definition 4), and explain it now with the concept of subgame. Given an initialized game
(G, v0), a strategy profile σ¯, and a player i strategy σ′i, we recall that σ′i has a hv-deviation
step from σ¯ for some hv ∈ Histi(v0), if hv < 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 and σi(hv) 6= σ′i(hv). Equivalently,
σ′i has a hv-deviation step from σ¯ iff
h·〈σ¯h〉v̂〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 = hv.
This alternative vision of deviation step is depicted in Figure 1 (right) for a strategy with
three deviation steps. For instance, for history h2v2, we have h2v2 < 〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 and
σi(h2v2) 6= σ′i(h2v2), or equivalently h2 ·〈σ¯h2〉v2̂〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 = h2v2. Notice that there is no
intermediate deviation step between the h1v1-deviation step and the h2v2-deviation step
since h2 ·〈σ¯h2〉v2 = h1v1 ·〈σ¯h1v1〉v′1 as indicated in the figure. Similarly the h1v1-deviation
step is the first one because h1 ·〈σ¯h1〉v1 = 〈σ¯〉v0 , and the h3v3-deviation step is the third
one because h3 ·〈σ¯h3〉v3 = h2v2 ·〈σ¯h2v2〉v′2 . The latter deviation step is the last one because
〈σ′i, σ−i〉v0 = h3v3 ·〈σ¯h3v3〉v′3 .
Proof of Proposition 13. This proof is based on arguments from the one-step deviation
property used to prove Kuhn’s theorem [9]. Let σ¯ be a very weak SPE, and let us prove that
it is a weak SPE. As a contradiction, assume that there exists a subgame (Gh, v) such that
the strategy profile σ¯h is not a weak NE. This means that there exists a player i strategy σ′i
in (Gh, v) such that σ′i is finitely deviating from σ¯h and
λi(hρ) > λi(hρ′), (1)
where ρ = 〈σ¯h〉v and ρ′ = 〈σ′i, σ−ih〉v. Let us consider such a strategy σ′i with a minimum
number n of deviation steps from 〈σ¯h〉v, and let gkvk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, be the histories in Histi(v)
such that σ′i has a gkvk-deviation step from 〈σ¯h〉v. Let us consider the subgame (Ghgn , vn)
(see Figure 4). In this subgame, σ′ign is not a profitable one-shot deviating strategy as σ¯ is a
very weak SPE. In other words, for % = 〈σ¯hgn〉vn and %′ = 〈σ′ign , σ−ihgn〉vn , we have
λi(hgn%) ≤ λi(hgn%′). (2)
Notice that n ≥ 2. Indeed, if n = 1, then ρ = g1%, ρ′ = g1%′, and λi(hρ) ≤ λi(hρ′) by
(2). Therefore σ′i is not a profitable deviation in (Gh, v), in contradiction with its definition
(1). We can thus construct a strategy τ ′i from σ
′
i such that these two strategies are the same
except in the subgame (Ghgn , vn) where τ ′i gn and σihgn coincide. In other words τ ′i has
n− 1 deviation steps from 〈σ¯h〉v, that are exactly the gkvk-deviation steps, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
of σ′i. Moreover, in the subgame (Gh, v), we have 〈τ ′i , σ−ih〉v = gn%, and
λi(hgn%) ≤ λi(hgn%′) < λi(hρ)
10 Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Games
v
v1
hρ
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hρ′
(Ghn , vn)
h
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Figure 4 A strategy σ′i with a minimum number n of deviation steps.
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by (1), (2), and gn%
′ = ρ′. It follows that τ ′i is a finitely deviating strategy that is profitable
for player i in (Gh, v), with less deviation steps than σ′i, a contradiction. This completes
the proof of the first statement of Proposition 13. For the second statement, it is enough to
consider Example 12. J
Under the next hypotheses on the game or the costs, the equivalence between SPE, weak
SPE, and very weak SPE holds. The first case, when the cost functions are continuous, is a
classical result in game theory, see for instance [7]; the second case appears as a part of the
proof of Kuhn’s theorem [9].
I Proposition 14. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game, and σ¯ be a strategy profile.
If all cost functions λi are continuous, or even upper-semicontinuous
5, then σ¯ is an SPE
iff σ¯ is a weak SPE iff σ¯ is a very weak SPE.
If G is a finite tree6, then σ¯ is an SPE iff σ¯ is a weak SPE iff σ¯ is a very weak SPE.
Proof. We only prove the first statement for cost functions λi that are upper-semicontinuous.
Let σ¯ be a strategy profile in an initialized game (G, v0). By Proposition 13, it remains to
prove that if σ¯ is a weak SPE, then it is an SPE, i.e., for each subgame (Gh, v), the strategy
profile σ¯h is a NE. Let σ′i be a player i strategy in (Gh, v). If σ′i is finitely deviating, then it
is not a profitable deviation for player i w.r.t. σ¯h by hypothesis. Therefore, suppose that
ρ′ = 〈σ′i, σ−ih〉v = g1g2 . . . gn . . .
such that σ′i has a hn-deviation step from σ¯h for all n ≥ 1, where h0 =  and hn = hn−1gn.
For each n, we define a finitely deviating strategy τni such that its deviation steps are
the first n deviation steps of σ′i, that is, τ
n
i and σ
′
i are equal except in the subgame
(Ghn ,First(gn+1)) where τni hn = σihhn . By hypothesis, τni is not a profitable deviation,
and thus for ρn = 〈τni , σ−ih〉v we have
λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) ≤ λi(hρn). (3)
As limn→∞ hρn = hρ′ and λi is upper-semicontinuous, we get lim supn→∞ λi(hρn) ≤ λi(hρ′).
Therefore by (3), λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) ≤ λi(hρ′) showing that σ′i is not a profitable deviation for
player i w.r.t. σ¯h. J
Recall that discounted sum games and quantitative reachability games are continuous.
Thus for these games, the three notions of SPE, weak SPE and very weak SPE, are equivalent.
I Corollary 15. Let (G, v0) be an initialized quantitative reachability game, and σ¯ be a
strategy profile. Then σ¯ is an SPE iff σ¯ is a weak SPE iff σ¯ is a very weak SPE.
On the opposite, the initialized game of Figure 3 has a weak SPE but no SPE. Its cost func-
tion λ2 is not upper-semicontinuous as limn→∞(v0v1)nvω3 = (v0v1)ω and limn→∞ λ2((v0v1)nvω3 )
= 1 > 0 = λ2((v0v1)ω).
5 In games where the players receive a payoff that they want to maximize, the hypothesis of upper-
semicontinuity has to be replaced by lower-semicontinuity.
6 In a finite tree game, the plays are finite sequences of vertices ending in a leaf and their cost is
associated with the ending leaf. An example of such a game is depicted in Figure 2.
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3 Folk Theorems
3.1 Folk Theorem for Weak SPEs
In this section, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all outcomes of
weak SPEs. Our approach is inspired7 by work [5] where a Folk Theorem is given for the set
of outcomes of SPEs in games with cost functions that are upper-semicontinuous and have
finite range. In this aim we define a nonincreasing sequence of sets of plays that initially
contain all the plays, and then loose, step by step, some plays that for sure are not outcomes
of a weak SPE, until finally reaching a fixpoint.
Let (G, v0) be a game. For an ordinal α and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), let us consider the
set Pα(hv) = {ρ | ρ is a potential outcome of a weak NE in (Gh, v) at step α}. This set is
defined by induction on α as follows:
I Definition 16. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative game. The set Pα(hv) is defined as follows
for each ordinal α and history hv ∈ Hist(v0):
For α = 0,
Pα(hv) = {ρ | ρ is a play in (Gh, v)}. (4)
For a successor ordinal α+ 1,
Pα+1(hv) = Pα(hv) \Eα(hv) (5)
such that ρ ∈ Eα(hv) (see Figure 5) iff
there exists a history h′, hv ≤ h′ < hρ, and Last(h′) ∈ Vi for some i,
there exists a vertex v′, h′v′ 6< hρ,
such that ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′): λi(hρ) > λi(h′ρ′).
For a limit ordinal α:
Pα(hv) =
⋂
β<α
Pβ(hv). (6)
Notice that an element ρ of Pα(hv) is a play in (Gh, v) (and not in (G, v0)). Therefore it
starts with vertex v, and hρ is a play in (G, v0). For α + 1 being a successor ordinal, play
ρ ∈ Eα(hv) is erased from Pα(hv) because for all ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′), player i pays a lower cost
λi(h′ρ′) < λi(hρ), which means that ρ is no longer a potentiel outcome of a weak NE in
(Gh, v).
The sequence (Pα(hv))α is nonincreasing by definition, and reaches a fixpoint in the
following sense.
I Proposition 17. There exists an ordinal α∗ such that Pα∗(hv) = Pα∗+1(hv) for all
histories hv ∈ Hist(v0).
Proof. Let us fix a history hv ∈ Hist(v0). The sequence (Pα(hv))α reaches a fixpoint as soon
as there exists α such that Pα(hv) = Pα+1(hv). Indeed it follows that Pα+1(hv) = Pα+2(hv)
and then Pα(hv) = Pβ(hv) for all β > α. As the sequence (Pα(hv))α is nonincreasing,
this happens at the latest with α being equal to the cardinality of P0(hv). Therefore with
α∗ = |V ω| being an ordinal greater than or equal to the cardinality of the set of all plays of
G, we get Pα∗(hv) = Pα∗+1(hv) for all hv ∈ Hist(v0). J
In the sequel, α∗ always refers to the ordinal mentioned in Proposition 17.
Our Folk Theorem for weak SPEs is the next one.
7 Our approach is however different.
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ρ ∈ Eα(hv) ∀ρ′ (Gh, v)Pα(h′v′)
h
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Figure 5 ρ ∈ Eα(hv).
I Theorem 18. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative game. There exists a weak SPE in (G, v0) with
outcome ρ iff Pα∗(hv) 6= ∅ for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), and ρ ∈ Pα∗(v0).
Before proving this theorem, we illustrate it with an example.
I Example 19. Consider the example of Figure 3. Clearly, as P0(hv2) only contains the
play vω2 , then Pα(hv2) = {vω2 } for all α. Similarly Pα(hv3) = {vω3 } for all α. Let us detail
the computation of Pα(hv0) and Pα(hv1).
α = 0. For history hv0, we have ρ = (v0v1)ω ∈ E0(hv0), since λ1(hρ) > λ1(hv0ρ′)
where ρ′ = vω2 is the unique play of P0(hv0v2). Similarly, for all n ≥ 1, we have
ρ = (v0v1)nv0vω2 ∈ E0(hv0), since λ2(hρ) > λ2(hv0v1ρ′) where ρ′ = vω3 is the unique play
of P0(hv0v1v3). Thus E0(hv0) = {(v0v1)ω} ∪ (v0v1)+v0vω2 and
P1(hv0) = {v0vω2 } ∪ (v0v1)+vω3 .
For history hv1, with the same kind of computations, we get E0(hv1) = {(v1v0)ω} ∪
(v1v0)+vω2 and
P1(hv1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 .
α = 1. For history hv0, we have ρ = v0vω2 ∈ E1(hv0). Indeed λ1(hρ) > λ1(hv0ρ′) for all
ρ′ ∈ P1(hv0v1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 . Notice that at the previous step, ρ = v0vω2 6∈ E0(hv0).
Indeed P1(hv0v1) ( P0(hv0v1), and λ1(hρ) ≤ λ1(hv0ρ′) for ρ′ = (v1v0)ω ∈ P0(hv0v1).8
Play v0v
ω
2 is the only one that is removed from P1(hv0), and no play can be removed
from P1(hv1). Therefore:
P2(hv0) = (v0v1)+vω3 , P2(hv1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 .
8 This shows that as the sequence (Pα(hv))α is nonincreasing for each hv, a play that is not removed
from some Pα(hv) can be removed later from some Pβ(hv) with β > α.
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α = 2. One checks that P3(hv0) = P2(hv0), and P3(hv1) = P2(hv1). Hence the
fixpoint is reached with α∗ = 2, with Pα∗(hv0) = (v0v1)+vω3 , Pα∗(hv1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 ,
Pα∗(hv2) = {vω2 }, and Pα∗(hv3) = {vω3 }. Therefore, the set of outcomes of weak SPEs
in this game is equal to (v0v1)+vω3 . The weak SPE depicted in Figure 3 has outcome
v0v1v
ω
3 .
The proof of Theorem 18 follows from Lemmas 20 and 21.
I Lemma 20. If (G, v0) has a weak SPE σ¯, then Pα∗(hv) 6= ∅ for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), and
〈σ¯〉v0 ∈ Pα∗(v0).
Proof. Let us show, by induction on α, that 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Pα(hv) for all hv ∈ Hist(v0).
For α = 0, we have 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Pα(hv) by definition of P0(hv).
Let α+ 1 be a successor ordinal. By induction hypothesis, we have that 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Pα(hv)
for all hv ∈ Hist(v0). Suppose that there exists hv such that 〈σ¯h〉v 6∈ Pα+1(hv), i.e.
〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Eα(hv). This means that there is a history h′ = hg ∈ Histi for some i ∈ Π
with hv ≤ h′ < hρ, and there exists a vertex v′ with h′v′ 6< hρ, such that ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′),
λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) > λi(h′ρ′). In particular, by induction hypothesis
λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) > λi(h′ ·〈σ¯h′〉v′). (7)
Let us consider the player i strategy σ′i in (Gh, v) such that g ·〈σ¯h′〉v′ is consistent with σ′i.
Then σ′i is a finitely deviating strategy with the (unique) g-deviation step from σ¯h. This
strategy is a profitable deviation for player i in (Gh, v) by (7), a contradiction with σ¯ being
a weak SPE.
Let α be a limit ordinal. By induction hypothesis 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Pβ(hv),∀β < α. Therefore
〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Pα(hv) =
⋂
β<αPβ(hv). J
I Lemma 21. Suppose that Pα∗(hv) 6= ∅ for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), and let ρ ∈ Pα∗(v0). Then
(G, v0) has a weak SPE with outcome ρ.
Proof. We are going to show how to construct a very weak SPE σ¯ (and thus a weak SPE
by Proposition 13) with outcome ρ. The construction of σ¯ is done step by step thanks to
a progressive labeling of the histories hv ∈ Hist(v0). Let us give an intuitive idea of the
construction of σ¯. Initially, we partially construct σ¯ such that it produces an outcome in
(G, v0) equal to ρ ∈ Pα∗(v0); we also label each non-empty prefix of ρ by ρ. Then we consider
a shortest non-labeled history h′v′, and we correctly choose some ρ′ ∈ Pα∗(h′v′) (we will
see later how). We continue the construction of σ¯ such that it produces the outcome ρ′ in
(Gh′ , v′), and for each non-empty prefix g of ρ′, we label h′g by ρ′ (notice that the prefixes
of h′ have already been labeled by choice of h′). And so on. In this way, the labeling is a
map γ : Hist(v0)→
⋃
hv Pα∗(hv) that allows to recover from h′g the outcome ρ′ of σ¯h′ in
(Gh′ , v′) of which g is prefix. Let us now go into the details.
Initially, none of the histories is labeled. We start with history v0 and the given play
ρ ∈ Pα∗(v0). The strategy profile σ¯ is partially defined such that 〈σ¯〉v0 = ρ, that is, if
ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., then σi(ρ≤n) = ρn+1 for all ρn ∈ Vi and i ∈ Π. The non-empty prefixes h of ρ
are all labeled with γ(h) = ρ.
At the following steps, we consider a history h′v′ that is not yet labeled, but such that
h′ has already been labeled. By induction, γ(h′) = 〈σ¯h〉v such that hv ≤ h′. Suppose that
Last(h′) ∈ Vi, we then choose a play ρ′ ∈ Pα∗(h′v′) such that (see Figure 6)
λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) ≤ λi(h′ρ′). (8)
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Figure 6 Construction of a very weak SPE σ¯.
Such a play ρ′ exists for the following reasons. By induction, we know that 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ Pα∗(hv).
Since Pα∗(hv) = Pα∗+1(hv) by Proposition 17, we have 〈σ¯h〉v 6∈ Eα∗(hv), and we get the
existence of ρ′ by definition of Eα∗(hv). We continue to construct σ¯ such that 〈σ¯h′〉v′ = ρ′,
i.e. if ρ′ = ρ′0ρ′1 . . ., then σi(h′ρ′≤n) = h′ρ′n+1 for all ρ′n ∈ Vi and i ∈ Π. For all non-empty
prefixes g of ρ′, we define γ(h′g) = ρ′ (notice that the prefixes of h′ have already been
labeled).
Let us show that the constructed profile σ¯ is a very weak SPE. Consider a history
hv ∈ Histi for some i ∈ Π, and a one-shot deviating strategy σ′i from σ¯h in the subgame
(Gh, v). Let v′ be such that σ′i(v) = v′. By definition of σ¯, we have γ(hv) = 〈σ¯g〉u for some
history gu ≤ hv and h·〈σ¯h〉v = g ·〈σ¯g〉u; and we have also γ(hvv′) = 〈σ¯hv〉v′ . Moreover
λi(g·〈σ¯g〉u) ≤ λi(hv·〈σ¯hv〉v′) by (8), and λi(hv·〈σ¯hv〉v′) = λi(h·〈σ′i, σ−ih〉v) because σ′i is
one-shot deviating. Therefore
λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) = λi(g ·〈σ¯g〉u) ≤ λi(hv ·〈σ¯hv〉v′) = λi(h·〈σ′i, σ−ih〉v)
which shows that σ¯h is a very weak NE in (Gh, v). Hence σ¯ is a very weak SPE, and thus
also a weak SPE. J
The next lemma will be useful in Sections 4 and 5. It states that if a play ρ belongs
to Pα(hv), then each of its suffixes ρ1 also belongs to Pα(hh1v1) such that h1ρ1 = ρ and
v1 = First(ρ1).
I Lemma 22. Let ρ ∈ Pα(hv). Then for all h1ρ1 = ρ, we have ρ1 ∈ Pα(hh1v1) with
v1 = First(ρ1).
Proof. The proof is by induction on α. The lemma trivially holds for α = 0 by definition of
P0(hv).
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Let α + 1 be a successor ordinal. Let ρ ∈ Pα+1(hv) and h1ρ1 = ρ with v1 = First(ρ1).
As Pα+1(hv) ⊆ Pα(hv), by induction hypothesis, we have ρ1 ∈ Pα(hh1v1). Suppose that
ρ1 ∈ Eα(hh1v1) (hence using a history h′ and a vertex v′ as in Definition 16). Then one can
easily check by definition of Eα(hh1v1) that ρ ∈ Eα(hv) (by using the same h′ and v′), which is
a contradiction with ρ ∈ Pα+1(hv). Therefore ρ1 ∈ Pα(hh1v1) \Eα(hh1v1) = Pα+1(hh1v1).
Let α be a limit ordinal, and suppose that ρ ∈ Pα(hv). As ρ ∈ Pβ(hv) for all β < α,
we have ρ1 ∈ Pβ(hh1v1) by induction hypothesis. It follows that ρ1 ∈ Pα(hh1v1) =⋂
β<αPβ(hh1v1). J
3.2 Folk Theorem for SPEs
In this section, as for weak SPEs, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set
of all outcomes of SPEs. Nevertheless, we here need a more complex characterization with
adapted sets P′α(hv), and this characterization only holds for cost functions that are upper-
semicontinuous.9 The main difference appears in the definition of sets E′α(hv) that will be
used in place of Eα(hv). Indeed we will see that the set Pα(h′v′) of Figure 5 has to be
replaced by a more complex set DH,iα (h′v′).
Let (G, v0) be a game. For an ordinal α and a history hv ∈ Hist(v0), as in the previous
section, we consider the set P′α(hv) = {ρ | ρ is a potential outcome of a NE10 in (Gh, v)
at step α}. In order to define these sets P′α(hv), we need to introduce new definitions. In
Definition 4, we have introduced the notion of deviation step of a strategy from a given
strategy profile. We here propose another concept of deviation step in relation with two
plays (see Figure 7).
I Definition 23. Let h′v′ ∈ Hist(v0) and ρ′ ∈ (Gh′ , v′). Let h1u1, h2u2 ∈ Hist(v0) with
u1, u2 ∈ V , and ρ1 in P′α(h1u1). We say that ρ′ has a h2u2-deviation step from ρ1 if
h′v′ ≤ h1u1 < h2u2 < h′ρ′ and h′ρ′̂h1ρ1 = h2.
Let us denote by H(h′v′) the set of all histories h2u2 such that h′v′ < h2u2. Given a
player i and H ⊆ H(hv), the next definition introduces the notion of (H, i)-decomposition of
a play ρ′. Such a play has a finite or infinite number of deviation steps such that for each
hnun-deviation step, the history hnun belongs to H. Figure 8 illustrates the second case of
Definition 24, with the deviation steps highlighted with dashed edges. This definition also
introduces the set DH,iα (h′v′) composed of plays with a maximal (H, i)-decomposition.
I Definition 24. Let h′v′ ∈ Hist(v0) and ρ′ ∈ (Gh′ , v′). Let i be a player, and H ⊆ H(h′v′).
ρ′ has an infinite (H, i)-decomposition ρ′ = g1g2 . . . gn . . . if
for all n ≥ 1, Last(gn) ∈ Vi
for all n ≥ 2, hnun ∈ H, and ρ′ has a hnun-deviation step from some ρn−1 ∈
P′α(hn−1un−1)
where h1 = h′, hn+1 = hngn, and un = First(gn) ∀n ≥ 1.
ρ′ has a finite (H, i)-decomposition ρ′ = g1g2 . . . gm%′ if
for all n, 1 ≤ n ≤ m, Last(gn) ∈ Vi
for all n, 2 ≤ n ≤ m + 1, hnun ∈ H, and ρ′ has a hnun-deviation step from some
ρn−1 ∈ P′α(hn−1un−1)
%′ ∈ P′α(hm+1um+1)
9 For games where players receive a payoff that they want to maximize, a similar Folk Theorem also
exists for lower-semicontinuous cost functions.
10 instead of a weak NE
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Figure 7 Deviation step.
where h1 = h′, hn+1 = hngn, un = First(gn) ∀n, 1 ≤ n ≤ m, and um+1 = First(%′).
We denote by DH,iα (h′v′) the set of plays ρ′ with a maximal (H, i)-decomposition in the
following sense:
ρ′ has an infinite (H, i)-decomposition, or
ρ′ has a finite (H, i)-decomposition ρ′ = g1g2 . . . gm%′, and there exists no ρ′′ with
a (H, i)-decomposition ρ′′ = g1g2 . . . gm′ . . . or ρ′′ = g1g2 . . . gm′%′′ such that ρ′̂ρ′′ =
g1g2 . . . gm+1.
In the previous definition, H can be chosen finite, infinite, or empty. If H = ∅, then for
all i ∈ Π, for each ρ′ ∈ DH,iα (h′v′), ρ′ has no deviation step and thus ρ′ ∈ P′α(h′v′). This
means that DH,iα (h′v′) = P′α(h′v′) in this case.
We are ready to define the sets P′α(hv) by induction on α. The definition is similar to
the one of Pα(hv), except that when we erase ρ ∈ E′α(hv) from P′α(hv), we use some set
DH,iα (h′v′) in place of P′α(h′v′):
I Definition 25. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative game. The set P′α(hv) is defined as follows
for each ordinal α and history hv ∈ Hist(v0):
For α = 0,
P′α(hv) = {ρ | ρ is a play in (Gh, v)}. (9)
For a successor ordinal α+ 1,
P′α+1(hv) = P′α(hv) \E′α(hv) (10)
such that ρ ∈ E′α(hv) iff
there exists a history h′, hv ≤ h′ < hρ, and Last(h′) ∈ Vi for some i,
there exists a vertex v′, h′v′ 6< hρ,
there exists H ⊆ H(h′v′),
such that ∀ρ′ ∈ DH,iα (h′v′): λi(hρ) > λi(h′ρ′).
(see Figure 5 where Eα(hv) is replaced by E′α(hv), and P′α(h′v′) is replaced byDH,iα (h′v′)).
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Figure 8 ρ′ = g1g2 . . . gm%′ with a finite (H, i)-decomposition.
For a limit ordinal α:
P′α(hv) =
⋂
β<α
P′β(hv). (11)
Let us comment the case α+ 1. When H = ∅, we have DH,iα (h′v′) = P′α(h′v′). Hence we
recover the previous situation of weak SPEs. Using different sets H ⊆ H(h′v′) and DH,iα (h′v′)
allow to have sets E′α(hv) bigger than Eα(hv), and thus more plays removed from P′α(hv)
than in Pα(hv). This situation will be illustrated in Example 28 hereafter.
The sequence (P′α(hv))α is nonincreasing by definition, and reaches a fixpoint in the
following sense (the proof is the same as for Proposition 17).
I Proposition 26. There exists an ordinal β∗ such that P′β∗(hv) = P
′
β∗+1(hv) for all histories
hv ∈ Hist(v0).
Our Folk Theorem for SPEs is the next one. The second statement requires to work with
upper-semicontinuous cost functions λi, i ∈ Π.
I Theorem 27. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative game.
If there exists an SPE in (G, v0) with outcome ρ, then P′β∗(hv) 6= ∅ for all hv ∈ Hist(v0),
and ρ ∈ P′β∗(v0).
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Suppose that all cost functions λi are upper-semicontinuous. If P′β∗(hv) 6= ∅ for all hv ∈
Hist(v0), then there exists an SPE in (G, v0) with outcome ρ, for all ρ ∈ P′β∗(v0).
I Example 28. Before proving this theorem, we illustrate it with the example of Figure 3
by showing that this game has no SPE (as stated in [16]). Let us compute the sets P′α(hv)
and let us show that P′3(hv2) = ∅. By the first statement of Theorem 27, we will get that
there is no SPE.
We have to do computations that are more complex than the ones of Example 19, due to
the usage of sets DH,iα (h′v′), with H ⊆ H(h′v′), instead of Pα(h′v′). Clearly, by definition
P′0(hv) = P0(hv) for all hv, and we have P′α(hv2) = {vω2 } and P′α(hv3) = {vω3 } for all α as
in Example 19.
Let us first illustrate Definition 24 with the computation of DH,20 (v0) with H = {v0v1v0,
(v0v1)2v0}. The play ρ′1 = (v0v1)2v0vω2 has a (H, 2)-decomposition g1g2%′1 with g1 = g2 = v0v1
and %′ = vω2 (two deviation steps). Indeed ρ′1 has a v0v1v0-deviation step from v0v1vω3 ∈
P′α(v0) and a (v0v1)2v0-deviation step from (v0v1)2vω3 ∈ P′α(v0v1v0), Last(g1),Last(g2) ∈ V2,
and %′1 ∈ P′α((v0v1)2v0). This play ρ′1 belongs to DH,20 (v0) because its (H, 2)-decomposition
uses the two possible steps of H. On the contrary ρ′2 = (v0v1)2vω3 has a (H, 2)-decomposition
g1%
′
2 with %
′
2 = v0v1vω3 , and does not belong to D
H,2
0 (v0) because ρ′1̂ρ′2 = g1g2. One can
check that DH,2(v0) = {v0vω2 , v0v1v0vω2 } ∪ {(v0v1)2%′ | %′ ∈ (G(v0v1)2 , v0)}.
We can now detail the computation of P′α(hv0) and P′α(hv1).
α = 0. For history hv0, we have E′0(hv0) ⊇ E0(hv0) = {(v0v1)ω} ∪ (v0v1)+v0vω2 because
DH,i0 (h′v′) = P′0(h′v′) = P0(h′v′) when H = ∅. In fact, one checks that E′0(hv0) =
E0(hv0), and thus
P′1(hv0) = P1(hv0) = {v0vω2 } ∪ (v0v1)+vω3 .
For instance, if we try to remove v0v
ω
2 with cost (1, 2) from P′0(hv0), we have to use some
H such that DH,10 (hv0v1) ⊆ v1(v0v1)∗vω3 (with cost (0, 1)). Such a H does not exist. For
history hv1, we also have E′0(hv1) = E0(hv1) and
P′1(hv1) = P1(hv1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 .
α = 1. Again we have
P′2(hv0) = P2(hv0) = (v0v1)+vω3 , P′2(hv1) = P2(hv1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 .
α = 2. A difference appears at this step: P3(hv1) = v1(v0v1)∗vω3 whereas
P′3(hv1) = ∅.
Indeed E′2(hv1) = P′2(hv1). Consider for instance ρ = v1vω3 ∈ P′2(hv1), and H =
hv1v0(v1v0)+ ⊆ H(hv1v0). Then DH,22 (hv1v0) has a unique play ρ′ = (v0v1)ω, and
λ2(hρ) > λ2(hv1ρ′).
Proof of Theorem 27. We begin by the first statement. Let σ¯ be an SPE. As in the proof
of Lemma 20, let us show by induction on α that 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ P′α(hv) for all hv ∈ Hist(v0).
For α = 0, we have 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ P′α(hv) by definition of P′0(hv).
Let α+ 1 be a successor ordinal. By induction hypothesis, we have that 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ P′α(hv)
for all hv. Suppose that 〈σ¯h〉v 6∈ P′α+1(hv), i.e. 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ E′α(hv). This means that there
is a history h′ = hg ∈ Histi for some i with hv ≤ h′ < hρ, there exists a vertex v′ with
h′v′ 6< hρ, and there exists H ⊆ H(h′v′), such that ∀ρ′ ∈ DH,iα (h′v′),
λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) > λi(h′ρ′). (12)
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Let us consider player i strategy σ′i in the subgame (Gh, v) such that σ′i coincide with σih
except that
σ′i(h′1) = v′1, for all hh′1v′1 ∈ H ∪ {h′v′}. (13)
Let gρ∗ = 〈σ′i, σ−ih〉v. We get that ρ∗ has a maximal (H, i)-decomposition such that
each ρn−1 ∈ P′α(hn−1un−1) of Definition 24 is equal to 〈σ¯hn−1〉un−1 (this play belongs to
P′α(hn−1un−1) by induction hypothesis). Each deviation step of ρ∗ in the sense of Definition 24
corresponds to a deviation step of ρ∗ in the sense of Definition 411. Moreover the (H, i)-
decomposition of ρ∗ is finite (resp. infinite) iff σ′i is finitely (resp. infinitely) deviating from
σ¯h. Thus this play ρ∗ belongs to DH,iα (h′v′), and by (12) we get λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) > λi(hgρ∗).
Hence σ′i is a profitable deviation for player i in (Gh, v), a contradiction with σ¯ being an
SPE.
Let α be a limit ordinal. By induction hypothesis 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ P′β(hv),∀β < α. Therefore
〈σ¯h〉v ∈ P′α(hv) =
⋂
β<αP′β(hv).
Let us now turn to the second statement of Theorem 27. Let ρ ∈ P′β∗(v0). By Propos-
ition 14, it is enough to construct a very weak SPE σ¯ with outcome ρ. The proof is very
similar to the one of Lemma 21, where the construction of σ¯ is done step by step thanks to a
labeling γ of the histories. We briefly recall this proof and insist on the differences.
Initially, no history is labeled. We start with the play ρ ∈ P′β∗(v0), σ¯ is partially defined
such that 〈σ¯〉v0 = ρ, and γ(h) = ρ for all non-empty prefixes h of ρ.
At the following steps, let h′v′ be a history that is not yet labeled, but such that h′
has already been labeled. Suppose that Last(h′) ∈ Vi. By induction, γ(h′) = 〈σ¯h〉v such
that hv ≤ h′, and 〈σ¯h〉v ∈ P′β∗(hv). Since P′β∗(hv) = P′β∗+1(hv) by Proposition 26, we
have 〈σ¯h〉v 6∈ E′β∗(hv). Therefore, with H = ∅ and DH,iβ∗ (h′v′) = P′β∗(h′v′), we know that
there exists a play ρ′ ∈ P′β∗(h′v′) such that λi(h ·〈σ¯h〉v) ≤ λi(h′ρ′). Hence, we continue
to construct σ¯ such that 〈σ¯h′〉v′ = ρ′, and all non-empty prefixes g of ρ′ are labeled by
γ(h′g) = ρ′. And so on.
The constructed σ¯ is a very weak SPE as in the proof of Lemma 21. J
The next proposition states that for cost functions that are upper-semicontinuous, sets
P′β∗(hv) and Pα∗(hv) are all equal. This no longer the case as soon as one cost function is
not upper-semicontinuous as shown by Examples 19 and 28.
I Proposition 29. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative game such that all its cost functions are
upper-semicontinuous. Then for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), P′β∗(hv) = Pα∗(hv).
Proof. Let us prove by induction on α that P′α(hv) ⊆ Pα(hv) for all hv. These two sets
are equal for α = 0. Let α + 1 be a successor ordinal and suppose that P′α(hv) ⊆ Pα(hv).
We have E′α(hv) ⊇ Eα(hv), and thus P′α+1(hv) ⊆ Pα+1(hv), because DH,iα (h′v′) = P′α(h′v′)
when H = ∅. For α being a limit ordinal, we easily have P′α(hv) ⊆ Pα(hv) by induction
hypothesis.
Suppose now that P′β∗(hv) ( Pα∗(hv) for some hv. Let ρ ∈ Pα∗(hv) \ P′β∗(hv), and
consider the initialized game (G′, v′0) = (Gh, v). Notice that the sets Pα(h′v′) and Eα(h′v′)
of this game (G′, v′0) are exactly the sets Pα(hh′v′) and Eα(hh′v′) of (Gh, v). By Theorem 18,
there exists a weak SPE σ¯ in (G′, v′0) with outcome ρ. Since the cost functions are upper-
semicontinuous, σ is also an SPE by Proposition 14. Therefore, ρ ∈ P′β∗(hv) by Theorem 27,
which is a contradiction. J
11History h′v′ leads to one additional deviation step of ρ∗ in the sense of Definition 4 (see (13)).
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4 Quantitative Reachability Games
In this section, we focus on quantitative reachability games. Recall that in this case, the
cost of a play for player i is the number of edges to reach his target set of vertices Ti (see
Definition 2). Recall also that for quantitative reachability games, SPEs, weak SPEs, and
very weak SPEs, are equivalent notions (see Corollary 15).
It is known that there always exists an SPE in quantitative reachability games [1, 6].
I Theorem 30. Each quantitative reachability game (G, v0) has an SPE.
As SPEs and weak SPEs coincide in quantitative reachability games, we get the next
result by Theorem 18.
I Corollary 31. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game. The sets Pα∗(hv) are
non-empty, for all hv ∈ Hist(v0), and Pα∗(v0) is the set of outcomes of SPEs in (G, v0).
The proof provided for Theorem 30 is non constructive since it relies on topological
arguments. Our main result is that one can algorithmically construct an SPE in (G, v0) that
is moreover finite-memory, thanks to the sets Pα∗(hv).
I Theorem 32. Each quantitative reachability initialized game (G, v0) has a finite-memory
SPE. Moreover there is an algorithm to construct such an SPE.
We can also decide whether there exists a (finite-memory) SPE such that the cost of its
outcome is component-wise bounded by a given constant vector.
I Corollary 33. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability initialized game, and let c¯ ∈ N|Π|
be a given |Π|-uple of integers. Then one can decide whether there exists a (finite-memory)
SPE σ¯ such that λi(〈σ¯〉v0) ≤ ci for all i ∈ Π.
The main ingredients of the proof of Theorem 32 are the next ones; they will be detailed
in the sequel of this section. We will give afterwards the proof of Corollary 33.
Given α, the infinite number of sets Pα(hv) can be replaced by the finite number of sets
PIα(v) where I is the set of players that did not reach their target set along history h.
The fixpoint of Proposition 17 is reached with some natural number α∗ ∈ N.
Each PIα(v) is a non-empty ω-regular set, thus containing a “lasso play” of the form h·gω.
The lasso plays of each PIα(v) allow to construct a finite-memory SPE.
The next lemma highlights a simple useful property of the cost functions λi used in
quantitative reachability games. The proof is immediate.
I Lemma 34. Let i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ Pα(hv). If player i did not reach his target set along
history h, then λi(hρ) = λi(ρ) + |hv|.
The next proposition is a key result that will be used several times later on. It states
that it is impossible to have plays in Pα(hv) with arbitrarily large costs for player i, without
having a play in Pα(hv) with an infinite cost for player i.
I Proposition 35. Consider Pα(hv) and i ∈ Π. If for all ρ ∈ Pα(hv), we have λi(ρ) < +∞,
then there exists c such that for all ρ ∈ Pα(hv), we have λi(ρ) ≤ c. The constant c only
depends on Pα(hv) and player i.
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Proof. Suppose that for all n ∈ N, there exists ρn ∈ Pα(hv) such that λi(ρn) > n. By
Ko¨nig’s lemma, there exists ρ = limk→∞ ρnk for some subsequence (ρnk)k of (ρn)n. By
definition of λi in quantitative reachability games, we get λi(ρ) = +∞. Let us prove by
induction on α that ρ ∈ Pα(hv); this will establish Proposition 35.
Let α = 0. As each ρn ∈ P0(hv), then ρn is a play in (Gh, v) by definition of P0(hv)
(see (4) in Definition 16). Therefore ρ is also a play in (Gh, v), and ρ ∈ P0(hv).
Let α+ 1 be a successor ordinal. As for all n, ρn ∈ Pα+1(hv) ⊆ Pα(hv), then ρ ∈ Pα(hv)
by induction hypothesis. Let us prove that ρ ∈ Pα+1(hv). Suppose on the contrary that
ρ ∈ Eα(hv) (see Definition 16 and Figure 5). Then there exists a history h′ ∈ Histj with
j ∈ Π and hv ≤ h′ < hρ, there exists a vertex v′ with h′v′ 6< hρ, such that ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′):
λj(hρ) > λj(h′ρ′). (14)
It follows that player j did not reach his target set along h′. Hence by Lemma 34, we have
λj(hρ) = λj(ρ) + |hv| and λj(h′ρ′) = λj(ρ′) + |h′v′|. By (14), λj(ρ′) is bounded. Hence by
induction hypothesis with Pα(h′v′) and j ∈ Π, there exists a constant c such that λj(ρ′) ≤ c,
∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′).
Suppose first that λj(ρ) < +∞. Then, since ρ = limk→∞ ρnk , it follows that for a large
enough nk, the plays ρ and ρnk share a long common prefix on which player j reaches its
target set, i.e. λj(ρ) = λj(ρnk). It follows that with the same history h′v′ as above, by (14)
and Lemma 34, we have λj(hρnk) > λj(h′ρ′), ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′), showing that ρnk ∈ Eα(hv), a
contradiction.
Suppose next that λj(ρ) = +∞. Then, given c′ = |h′v′| − |hv| + c, we can choose a large
enough nk such that the plays ρ and ρnk share a common prefix of length at least c
′.
Moreover, as λj(ρ) = +∞, player j does not reach its target set along this prefix, i.e.
λj(ρnk) > c′. Therefore, using the same history h′v′ as above, by (14) and Lemma 34,
we have λj(hρnk) > |hv| + c′ = |h′v′| + c ≥ λj(h′ρ′), ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′v′). This shows that
ρnk ∈ Eα(hv), again a contradiction.
Let α be a limit ordinal. As for all n, ρn ∈ Pα(hv) =
⋂
β<αPβ(hv) (see (6) in Defin-
ition 16), then ρ ∈ Pβ(hv),∀β < α, by induction hypothesis. Hence ρ ∈ Pα(hv) =⋂
β<αPβ(hv).
We have just shown that if all plays ρ ∈ Pα(hv) have a cost λi(ρ) < +∞, then there exists
c such that λi(ρ) ≤ c for all such ρ. This constant c depends on Pα(hv) and player i. J
As a consequence of Proposition 35, we have that sup{λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Pα(hv)} is equal to
max{λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Pα(hv)}, and that this maximum belongs to N ∪ {+∞}.
4.1 Sets PIα(v)
Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game. Given a history h = h0 . . . hn in (G, v0), we
denote by I(h) the set of players i such that ∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we have hk 6∈ Ti. In other words
I(h) is the set of players that did not reach their target set along history h. If h is empty,
then I(h) = Π. The next lemma indicates that sets Pα(hv) only depend on v and I(h),
and thus not on h (we do no longer take care of players that have reached their target set
along h).
I Lemma 36. For h1v, h2v ∈ Hist(v0), if I(h1) = I(h2), then Pα(h1v) = Pα(h2v) for all α.
Proof. The proof is by induction on α. By definition, we have P0(h1v) = P0(h2v).
Suppose that α+ 1 is a successor ordinal. By induction hypothesis, Pα(h1v) = Pα(h2v).
Let us prove that Eα(h1v) = Eα(h2v) which will imply that Pα+1(h1v) = Pα+1(h2v). If
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ρ ∈ Eα(h1v), it means that there exists a history h′1 = h1g ∈ Histi with h′1 < h1ρ, there
exists a vertex v′ with h′1v
′ 6< h1ρ, such that ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′1v′), we have λi(h1ρ) > λi(h′1ρ′),
i.e.
λi(ρ) > λi(gρ′). (15)
In particular, i ∈ I(h′1). Let us consider the history h′2 = h2g. By hypothesis, I(h1) = I(h2),
and therefore I(h′1) = I(h′2) and i ∈ I(h′2). Thus by induction hypothesis Pα(h′1v′) =
Pα(h′2v′). It follows that for ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(h′2v′), we have λi(h2ρ) > λi(h2gρ′) = λi(h′2ρ′) by
(15), and then ρ ∈ Eα(h2v). Symmetrically, if ρ ∈ Eα(h2v), then ρ ∈ Eα(h1v). We can
conclude that Pα+1(h1v) = Pα+1(h2v).
Suppose that α is a limit ordinal. As Pα(h1v) =
⋂
β<αPβ(h1v), and Pβ(h1v) = Pβ(h2v)
by induction hypothesis, it follows that Pα(h1v) = Pα(h2v). J
Thanks to this lemma, we can introduce the next definitions.
I Definition 37. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability initialized game. Let I ⊆ Π be
such that I = I(h) for some h ∈ Hist(v0). We denote by
PIα(v) the set Pα(hv), and by
EIα(v) the set Eα(hv).
In particular, PΠα (v0) = Pα(v0) and EΠα (v0) = Eα(v0).
Given α, the infinite number of sets Pα(hv) can thus be replaced by the finite number of
sets PIα(v). Moreover, Proposition 35 can be rephrased as follows.
I Corollary 38. Consider PIα(v) and i ∈ I. If for all ρ ∈ PIα(v), we have λi(ρ) < +∞, then
there exists c such that for all ρ ∈ PIα(v), we have λi(ρ) ≤ c. The constant c only depends
on α, I, v, and i.
Proof. Let h be such that I = I(h). Consider Pα(hv) = PIα(v), and i ∈ I. By Proposition 35,
if for all ρ ∈ Pα(hv), λi(ρ) < +∞, then there exists c (depending on Pα(hv) and i) such
that for all ρ ∈ Pα(hv), λi(ρ) ≤ c. By Lemma 36, c depends on α, I, v, and i. J
As a consequence of Corollary 38, we give the next definition that indicates the maximum
costs for plays in PIα(v).
I Definition 39. Given PIα(v), we define Λ(PIα(v)) such that
Λi(PIα(v)) =
{ −1 if i 6∈ I,
max{λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ PIα(v)} if i ∈ I.
In this definition, −1 indicates that player i has already visited his target set Ti, and the
max belongs to N ∪ {+∞}.
4.2 Fixpoint with α∗ ∈ N
In this section, we aim at proving that the fixpoint (when computing the sets PIα(v), see
Proposition 17) is reached in a finite number of steps, that is α∗ ∈ N.
We first need to introduce some notions about the sets PIα(v). Let ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ PIα(v).
We use a map χ that decorates each ρn by some set J ⊆ Π. The aim of the decoration χ(ρn)
is to indicate at vertex ρn, which players of I did not reach their target set along ρ<n. More
precisely, χ(ρn) = I ∩ I(ρ<n). In particular χ(ρ0) = I ∩Π = I.
24 Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Games
Let PIα(v) and (v, v′) ∈ E. We now adapt Definition 39 to mention the maximum costs
for plays in PIα(v) starting with edge (v, v′). We define Λ(PIα(v), v′) as follows:
Λi(PIα(v), v′) =
{ −1 if i 6∈ I,
max{λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ PIα(v) and ρ0ρ1 = vv′} if i ∈ I.
(16)
In this definition, the max is equal to -1 when the set {λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ PIα(v) and ρ0ρ1 = vv′} is
empty.12
The sequence (Λ(PIα(v), v′))α is nonincreasing for the usual component-wise ordering
over (N∪{−1,+∞})Π since PIα(v) is nonincreasing for the inclusion by definition. Therefore
it reaches a fixpoint that we want to relate to the fixpoint PIα∗(v) of Proposition 17. This is
done in the following lemma.
I Lemma 40. If PIα(v) = PIα+1(v), then for all (v, v′) ∈ E, Λ(PIα(v), v′) = Λ(PIα+1(v), v′).
If PIα(v) 6= PIα+1(v), then there exist J ⊆ Π and (u, u′) ∈ E such that Λ(PJα(u), u′) 6=
Λ(PJα+1(u), u′).
Proof. The first statement is immediate from definition of Λ. Let us prove the second
statement. Consider ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ EIα(v). Then there exist i ∈ Π, n ∈ N and v′ 6= ρn+1 with
ρn ∈ Vi, χ(ρn) = J , χ(ρn+1) = J ′, such that ∀ρ′ ∈ PJ′α (v′) we have λi(ρ) > λi(ρ0 . . . ρnρ′)
or equivalently (by Lemma 34)
λi(ρ)− (n+ 1) > λi(ρ′). (17)
(see the definition of Eα(hv) with I(h) = I in Definition 16 and Figure 9). Notice that i ∈ J ′.
Let us prove that Λ(PJα(u), u′) 6= Λ(PJα+1(u), u′) with u = ρn and u′ = ρn+1. As ρ ∈ PIα(v),
v
u
v′u′
∈ Vi
I
J
J ′
ρ ∈ EIα(v) ∀ρ′ PJ′α (v′)
Figure 9 ρ ∈ EIα(v), with ρn = u and ρn+1 = u′.
then ρ≥n ∈ PJα(u) by Lemma 22. As λi(ρ≥n) = λi(ρ)− n, this implies that
Λi(PJα(u), u′) ≥ λi(ρ)− n. (18)
Let % ∈ PJα(u) be such that % starts with edge (u, u′) and has maximal cost Λi(PJα(u), u′).
One gets
λi(%) = Λi(PJα(u), u′) ≥ λi(ρ)− n > λi(ρnρ′)
12Notice that as PIα(v) is non-empty, there exists some (v, v′) ∈ E such that this set is non-empty.
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by (17) and (18). By considering the set PJ′α (v′) in Figure 9, it follows that % ∈ EJα(u) for all
such plays %. Hence PJα+1(u) ( PJα(u) and Λi(PJα+1(u), u′) < Λi(PJα(u), u′). This completes
the proof. J
We are now able to prove that the ordinal α∗ of Proposition 17 is an integer.
I Corollary 41. There exists an integer α∗ such that PIα∗(v) = PIα∗+1(v) for all v ∈ V and
I ⊆ Π.
Proof. Notice that there is a finite number of sequences (Λ(PIα(v), v′))α since they depend
on I ⊆ Π and (v, v′) ∈ E. As the component-wise ordering over (N ∪ {−1,+∞})Π is a
well-quasi-ordering and all these sequences are nonincreasing, there exists an integer (and not
only an ordinal) α′∗ such that Λ(PIα′∗(v), v
′) = Λ(PIα′∗+1(v), v
′) for all I ⊆ Π and (v, v′) ∈ E.
By Lemma 40, we get that α∗ ≤ α′∗, showing that α∗ ∈ N. J
4.3 The sets PIα(v) are ω-regular
In this section, we prove that each setPIα(v) is ω-regular. Instead of providing the construction
of a Bu¨chi automaton (which would lead to many technical details), we prefer to show that
each set PIα(v) is MSO-definable. It is well-known that a set of ω-words is ω-regular iff it
is MSO-definable, by Bu¨chi theorem [17]. Moreover from the Bu¨chi automaton, one can
construct an equivalent MSO-sentence, and conversely. One can also decide whether an
MSO-sentence is satisfiable [17]. We recall that MSO-logic uses:
variables x, y, . . . (X,Y, . . . resp.) to describe a position (a set of positions resp.) in an
ω-word ρ, and relations X(x) to mention that x belongs to X,
relations Qu(x), u ∈ V , to mention that such vertex u is at position x of ρ,
relations x < y and Succ(x, y) to mention that position y is after position x, and position
y is successor of position x respectively,
connectives ∨,∧,¬ and quantifiers ∃x, ∀x, ∃X, ∀X
Recall that constants 0, 1, . . . are definable. We will use notation x+ 1 (and more generally
x+ c, with c a constant) instead of Succ(x, y).
I Proposition 42. Each PIα(v) is an ω-regular set.
We begin with a lemma that states that if PIα(v) is ω-regular, then the maximum of its
costs is computable.
I Lemma 43. If PIα(v) is MSO-definable, then Λ(PIα(v)) is computable.
Proof. Before proving this lemma, we need to establish two properties. The first one states
that one can decide whether PIα(v) has a play ρ with a given cost for a given player. The
second one states that when Λi(PIα(v)) is finite, then this number is bounded by the number
of states of a Bu¨chi automaton accepting PIα(v).
(i) Let c ∈ N ∪ {+∞} and i ∈ I. Let φ be an MSO-sentence defining PIα(v). Let us
show that one can decide whether PIα(v) has a play ρ with cost λi(ρ) = c. There exists
an MSO-sentence ϕ expressing that λi(ρ) = c. Indeed, if c = +∞, then ϕ is the sentence
∀x·¬(∨u∈TiQu(x)), and if c < +∞, it is the sentence (∀x < c·¬(∨u∈TiQu(x)))∧(∨u∈TiQu(c)).
Therefore one can decide whether the MSO-sentence φ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable by some play ρ.
(ii) Let i ∈ I and suppose that Λi(PIα(v)) < +∞. Let B be a Bu¨chi automaton accepting
PIα(v). We now show that Λi(PIα(v)) < n where n is the number of states of B. Assume
the contrary and consider an accepting run r = r0r1 . . . of B on a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ PIα(v)
with λi(ρ) = Λi(PIα(v)) ≥ n. The prefix r≤n of r has a cycle rk . . . rl with 0 ≤ k < l ≤ n
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and rk = rl. This cycle can be repeated once, while keeping an accepting run labeled by
ρ′ = ρ0 . . . (ρk . . . ρl−1)2ρ≥l. As λi(ρ) ≥ n, it follows that λi(ρ′) = Λi(PIα(v)) + (l − k).
Therefore we get a contradiction with λi(ρ) = Λi(PIα(v)).
Let us prove the lemma. By definition Λi(PIα(v)) equals −1 if i 6∈ I, and is thus
computable in this case. Let i ∈ I. By (i), one can decide whether Λi(PIα(v)) = +∞.
In case of a positive answer, Λi(PIα(v)) is thus computable. If the answer is negative, as
Λi(PIα(v)) < n by (ii), we can similarly test whether Λi(PIα(v)) = c by considering decreasing
constants c from n− 1 to 0. This prove that Λ(PIα(v)) is computable. J
Proof of Proposition 42. Let us prove that each set PIα(v) is MSO-definable by induction
on α.
For α = 0, recall that PI0(v) is the set of plays starting with v. The required sentence is
thus Qv(0) ∧ ∀x · ∨(u,u′)∈E(Qu(x) ∧Qu′(x+ 1)).
Let α ∈ N be a fixed integer. By induction hypothesis, each set PIα(v) is MSO-definable,
and by Lemma 43, Λ(PIα(v)) is computable. These sets and constants can be considered
as fixed. Let us prove that EIα(v) is MSO-definable. It will follow that PIα+1(v) is also
MSO-definable. Thanks to Λ(PIα(v)), the definition of ρ ∈ EIα(v) can be rephrased as follows:
there exist n ∈ N, i ∈ I, and u, u′, v′ ∈ V with u′ 6= v′, (u, v′) ∈ E, such that ρn = u ∈ Vi,
ρn+1 = u′ , χ(ρn+1) = J ′, and
λi(ρ) > Λi(PJ
′
α (v′)) + (n+ 1) (19)
(see Figure 9). Notice that (19) implies that i ∈ J ′ and Λi(PJ′α (v′)) < +∞. Moreover
Λi(PJ
′
α (v′)) is a fixed integer.
Let us provide an MSO-sentence ψ defining EIα(v). The next sentence φJ′,n expresses
that J ′ ⊆ I is the subset of players of I that did not visit their target set along ρ≤n:
φJ′,n =
(∀x · (x ≤ n)→ ¬(∨j∈J′ ∨r∈Tj Qr(x))) ∧ (∧j∈I\J′∃x ≤ n · ∨r∈TjQr(x)) .
The next sentence ϕJ′,n,v′,i expresses that if player i visits its target set along ρ, it is after
Λi(PJ
′
α (v′)) + n+ 1 edges from ρ0:
ϕJ′,n,v′,i = ∀x ·
(
∨r∈TiQr(x)→
(
x > Λi(PJ
′
α (v′)) + n+ 1
))
.
Notice that in the previous formula, Λi(PJ
′
α (v′)) is a constant since PJ
′
α (v′) is a fixed set.
The required formula ψ is then the following one:
∃n ·
∨
u,u′ 6=v′∈V
(u,v′)∈E
∨
J′⊆I
∨
i∈J′,u∈Vi
Λi(PJ
′
α (v
′))<+∞
(Qu(n) ∧Qu′(n+ 1) ∧ φJ′,n ∧ ϕJ′,n,v′,i) .
J
By Proposition 42, the next corollary states that one can effectively extract a lasso play
from PIα(v) that has a maximal cost for a given player i.
I Corollary 44. For all i ∈ I, each set PIα∗(v) has a computable lasso play h ·gω with
λi(h·gω) = Λi(PIα∗(v)). This play depends on i, I, and v.
Proof. Part (i) of the proof of Lemma 43 indicates that the set of plays ρ ∈ PIα∗(v) with
maximal cost λi(ρ) = Λi(PIα∗(v)) is ω-regular. Therefore, from a Bu¨chi automaton accepting
this set, we can extract an accepted lasso play of the form h·gω with the required cost. Such
a play depends on i, I, and v (α∗ is fixed). J
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4.4 Construction of a Finite-Memory SPE
Thanks to the results of Sections 4.1-4.3, we have all the ingredients to prove that each
quantitative reachability game has a computable finite-memory SPE.
Proof of Theorem 32. Let (G, v0) be a quantitative reachability game. Let us summarize
the results obtained previously. By Corollary 31, each set PIα∗(v) is non-empty with v ∈ V
and I = I(h) for some history hv ∈ Hist(v0), and PΠα∗(v0) contains all the outcomes of SPEs
in (G, v0). By Corollary 41 and Proposition 42, we know that α∗ ∈ N and each PIα∗(v) is an
ω-regular set that can be constructed. Finally by Corollary 44, for all i ∈ I, one can construct
a lasso play hi,I,v ·(gi,I,v)ω ∈ PIα∗(v) with maximal cost λi(hi,I,v ·(gi,I,v)ω) = Λi(PIα∗(v)).
We now show how to construct a finite-memory SPE σ¯ from the finite set of lasso plays
hi,I,v·(gi,I,v)ω. The procedure is similar to the one developed in the proof of Theorem 18 and
more particularly of Lemma 21. We indicate how to adapt the proof of this lemma. Again
the construction of σ¯ is done step by step, thanks to a labeling γ of the non-empty histories.
Initially, none of the histories is labeled. We start with history v0 and with any play
hi,Π,v0 ·(gi,Π,v0)ω ∈ PΠα∗(v0), i ∈ Π. The strategy profile σ¯ is partially defined such that
〈σ¯〉v0 = hi,Π,v0 ·(gi,Π,v0)ω, and the non-empty prefixes h of hi,Π,v0 ·(gi,Π,v0)ω are all labeled
with γ(h) = (i,Π, v0).
At the following steps, we consider a history h′v′ that is not yet labeled, but such that h′
has already been labeled. By induction, γ(h′) = (j, I, v) and there exists hv ≤ h′ such that
〈σ¯h〉v = hj,I,v ·(gj,I,v)ω. Suppose that Last(h′) ∈ Vi and I(h′) = J ′, the proof of Lemma 21
requires to choose13 a play ρ′ ∈ PJ′α∗(v′) such that λi(h′ρ′) ≥ λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v) (see (8)). We simply
choose ρ′ = hi,J′,v′ ·(gi,J′,v′)ω that has maximal cost λi(hi,J′,v′ ·(gi,J′,v′)ω) = Λi(PJ′α∗(v′)).
Then we continue the construction of σ¯ such that 〈σ¯h′〉v′ = hi,J′,v′ ·(gi,J′,v′)ω, and for all
non-empty prefixes g of hi,J′,v′ ·(gi,J′,v′)ω, we define γ(h′g) = (i, J ′, v′).
By the proof of Lemma 21, the strategy profile σ¯ is an SPE. It is finite-memory since
for all h ∈ Histi, σi(h) only depends on γ(h) = (j, I, v) and hj,I,v ·(gj,I,v)ω. There is a finite
number of lasso plays hj,I,v ·(gj,I,v)ω, and γ(h) (as well as I(h)) can be computed inductively
as follows. Initially, I(v0) = Π, and γ(v0) = (i,Π, v0) for some chosen i ∈ Π. Let h′ ∈ Histi
and suppose that I(h′) = J ′ and γ(h′) = (j, I, v). Then I(h′v′) = J ′ \ {i | v′ ∈ Ti}. If h′v′
respects hj,I,v·(gj,I,v)ω, i.e. σi(h′) = v′, then γ(h′v′) = (j, I, v). Otherwise γ(h′v′) = (i, J ′, v′)
with (i, J ′, v′) computed as in the previous paragraph. J
4.5 Constrained Existence
It remains to prove the decidability of the constrained existence of SPE for quantitative
reachability games, as announced in Corollary 33. This result is easily proved on the basis of
some previous properties.
Proof of Corollary 33. Let (G, v0) be a game and let c¯ ∈ N|Π| be a constant vector. In the
proof of Lemma 43, we have seen that there exists an MSO-sentence expressing that play ρ
has a fixed cost λi(ρ) = ci. Similarly, one can express that λi(ρ) ≤ ci by the next sentence ϕi:
∃x ≤ ci · (∨u∈TiQu(x)). By Proposition 42, we know that the set PΠα∗(v0) of outcomes of
SPEs in (G, v0) is an ω-regular set, and that one can construct an MSO-sentence φ defining it.
Therefore the set of outcomes of SPEs with a cost component-wise bounded by c¯ is definable
by ∧i∈Πϕi∧φ, and is then ω-regular. Moreover, one can decide whether this set is non-empty.
13This proof states that such a play always exists.
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In case of positive answer, it contains a lasso play h·gω. Exactly as done in Section 4.4, one
can construct a finite-memory SPE σ¯ such that 〈σ¯〉v0 = h·gω. This concludes the proof. J
5 Games with Prefix-independent Regular Cost Functions
In this section, we present a class of games for which it is decidable whether there exists a
weak SPE.14 The hypotheses are general conditions on the cost functions λi, i ∈ Π: each
function λi must be prefix-independent (see Definition 3), λi has to use a finite number
of values (gathered in set Ci), and the set of plays ρ with a given cost λi(ρ) = ci must be
ω-regular.
I Theorem 45. Let (G, v0) be an initialized game such that:
each cost function λi is prefix-independent, and with finite range Ci ⊂ Q,
for all i ∈ Π, ci ∈ Ci, and v ∈ V , the set of plays ρ in (G, v) with λi(ρ) = ci is an
ω-regular set.
Then one can decide whether (G, v0) has a weak SPE σ¯ (resp. such that λi(〈σ¯〉v0) ≤ ci forall i
for given ci ∈ Ci, i ∈ Π). In case of positive answer, one can construct such a finite-memory
weak SPE.
For example, the hypotheses of this theorem are satisfied by the liminf games and the
limsup games; they are also satisfied by the game of Example 12. We will see that the proof
of this decidability result shares similar points with the proof given in the previous section
for quantitative reachability games. Again, we will use the Folk Theorem for weak SPEs (see
Theorem 18) to prove this result. The main steps of the proof are the following ones.
Given α, the infinite number of sets Pα(hv) can be replaced by the finite number of sets
Pα(v).
The fixpoint of Proposition 17 is reached with some natural number α∗ ∈ N.
Each Pα(v) is an ω-regular set. Therefore there exists an algorithm to construct the
sets Pα∗(v) for all v ∈ V , and thus to decide whether they are all non-empty. For given
constants ci ∈ Ci, i ∈ Π, one can also decide whether Pα∗(v0) has a play ρ with bounded
cost λi(ρ) ≤ ci for all i.
In case of positive answer, some lasso plays of the sets Pα∗(v) allow to construct a
finite-memory weak SPE (resp. with bounded cost).
To establish Theorem 45, we prove a series of lemmas. The first lemma states that Pα(hv)
is independent of h. There is thus a finite number of sets Pα(v), v ∈ V , to study.
I Lemma 46. Pα(hv) = Pα(v) for all hv ∈ Hist(v0).
Proof. The proof can be easily done by induction on α. It uses the definition of Eα(hv) and
the hypothesis of Theorem 45 that each cost function λi is prefix-independent. J
As each cost function λi is supposed to have finite range in Theorem 45, we can give the
next definition that indicates the maximum costs for plays in Pα(v) (resp. starting with vv′,
for some given (v, v′) ∈ E). Recall that a similar definition was given in case of quantitative
reachability games (see Definition 39 and (16)).
I Definition 47. Given Pα(v) and (v, v′) ∈ E, we define for each i ∈ Π:
14Contrarily to quantitative reachability games, we do not know if a weak SPE always exists for games
in this class.
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Λi(Pα(v)) = max{λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Pα(v)}.
Λi(Pα(v), v′) = max{λi(ρ) | ρ ∈ Pα(v) and ρ0ρ1 = vv′}.
In this definition, the max is equal to −∞ if it applies to an empty set.
The sequence (Λ(Pα(v), v′))α is nonincreasing for the component-wise ordering over
(Q ∪ {−∞})|Π|.15 Therefore it reaches a fixpoint as for (Pα(v))α. The following lemma
relates these sequences.
I Lemma 48. If Pα(v) = Pα+1(v), then for all (v, v′) ∈ E, Λ(Pα(v), v′) = Λ(Pα+1(v), v′).
If Pα(v) 6= Pα+1(v), then there exists (u, u′) ∈ E such that Λ(Pα(u), u′) 6= Λ(Pα+1(u), u′).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 40. Without mentioning it, we will
repeatedly use Lemma 46 and the hypothesis of Theorem 45 that the cost functions are
prefix-independent.
The first statement is immediate from definition of Λ. For the second statement, consider
ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ Eα(v). Then by definition of Eα(v), there exist n ∈ N, i ∈ Π, and u, u′, v′ ∈ V
with u′ 6= v′, (u, v′) ∈ E, such that ρn = u ∈ Vi, ρn+1 = u′, and
∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(v′) : λi(ρ) > λi(ρ′).
(See Figure 9 adapted to the context of Lemma 48). Let us prove that Λ(Pα(u), u′) 6=
Λ(Pα+1(u), u′). As ρ ∈ Pα(v), then ρ≥n ∈ Pα(u) by Lemma 22, which implies that
Λi(Pα(u), u′) ≥ λi(ρ≥n). Let % ∈ Pα(u) be such that % starts with edge (u, u′) and has
maximal cost Λi(Pα(u), u′). One gets
λi(%) = Λi(Pα(u), u′) ≥ λi(ρ≥n) = λi(ρ) > λi(ρ′).
Hence, using the same set Pα(v′) as for ρ, it follows that % ∈ Eα(u) for all such plays %.
Therefore Pα+1(u) ( Pα(u) and Λi(Pα(u), u′) < Λi(Pα+1(u), u′). J
As a consequence, the ordinal α∗ of Proposition 17 is an integer. The proof is the same
as for Corollary 41.
I Corollary 49. There exists an integer α∗ such that Pα∗(v) = Pα∗+1(v) for all v ∈ V .
As done for quantitative reachability games, let us now prove that the sets Pα(v) are
ω-regular for all α and v.
I Lemma 50. Each Pα(v) is an ω-regular set.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 43 and Proposition 42 (It is even simpler).
Recall that as soon as Pα(v) is empty, then Pβ(v) = ∅ for all β ≥ α.
Like in Lemma 43, we first prove that if Pα(v) is MSO-definable, then Λi(Pα(v)) is
computable for each i ∈ Π. Let φ be an MSO-sentence defining Pα(v). One can decide
whether Pα(v) is empty. If this is the case, then Λi(Pα(v)) = −∞ for all i. Suppose that
Pα(v) 6= ∅, and let i ∈ Π and c ∈ Ci. By hypothesis, the set of plays ρ in (G, v) with
cost λi(ρ) = c is ω-regular and thus MSO-definable by a sentence ϕc,i. We can thus decide
whether Pα(v) has a play ρ with cost λi(ρ) = c, thanks to sentence φ ∧ ϕc,i. Therefore, by
considering decreasing constants c ∈ Ci, we can decide whether Λi(Pα(v)) = c. This shows
that Λi(Pα(v)) is computable.
15More precisely each component in (Q ∪ {−∞})|Π| is restricted to Ci ∪ {−∞}.
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Let us now prove that each set Pα(v) is MSO-definable by induction on α. For α = 0,
we use the same defining MSO-sentence as in the proof of Proposition 42:
Qv(0) ∧ ∀x · ∨(u,u′)∈E(Qu(x) ∧Qu′(x+ 1)).
Let α ∈ N be a fixed integer. By induction hypothesis, each set Pα(v) is MSO-definable, and
Λi(PIα(v)), i ∈ Π, is computable by the first part of the proof. These sets and constants can
be considered as fixed. The only case to consider is Pα(v) 6= ∅ (recall that this property is
decidable). To show that Pα+1(v) is also MSO-definable, it is enough to prove that Eα(v)
is MSO-definable. Recall that ρ ∈ Eα(v) iff there exist n ∈ N, i ∈ Π, and u, u′, v′ ∈ V with
u′ 6= v′, (u, v′) ∈ E, such that ρn = u ∈ Vi, ρn+1 = u′, and ∀ρ′ ∈ Pα(v′): λi(ρ) > λi(ρ′).
The last condition can be replaced by λi(ρ) > Λi(Pα(v′)) 6= −∞.16 Let us provide an
MSO-sentence ψ defining Eα(v):
∃n ·
∨
i∈Π,u∈Vi
u′ 6=v′∈V
(u,v′)∈E
∨
c∈Ci
c>Λi(Pα(v′)) 6=−∞
(Qu(n) ∧Qu′(n+ 1) ∧ ϕc,i) .
J
We get the next corollary. The proof is the same as for Corollary 44.
I Corollary 51. If Pα(v) 6= ∅, then one can compute a lasso play h ·gω in Pα(v) with
λi(h·gω) = Λi(Pα(v)). This play depends on i and v.
We are now able to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 45. Let (G, v0) be a game satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 45.
Let us summarize the results of the previous lemmas. We know that α∗ ∈ N and that
one can construct the sets Pα∗(v), v ∈ V . As these sets are ω-regular, one can decide
whether they are all non-empty. In case of positive answer, there exists a weak SPE in
(G, v0) by Theorem 18. If in addition some constants ci ∈ Ci are given, then the set
Pα∗(v0) ∩ {ρ in (G, v0) | λi(ρ) ≤ ci,∀i ∈ Π} is also ω-regular. Hence one can also decide
whether this set is non-empty and thus whether there exists a weak SPE in (G, v0) with cost
component-wise bounded by c¯. This establishes the first part of Theorem 45.
Suppose that such a weak SPE exists, then let us show that we can construct a weak
SPE that is finite-memory with the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 32. By
Corollary 51, for all i ∈ Π, v ∈ V , one can construct a lasso play hi,v ·(gi,v)ω ∈ Pα∗(v) with
maximal cost λi(hi,v ·(gi,v)ω) = Λi(Pα∗(v)). The construction of a finite-memory SPE σ¯
from the finite set of lasso plays hi,v ·(gi,v)ω is conducted as in the proof of Lemma 21. It is
done step by step thanks to a labeling γ of the non-empty histories.
Initially, none of the histories is labeled. We start with history v0 and with any play
hi,v0 · (gi,v0)ω ∈ Pα∗(v0), i ∈ Π.17 The strategy profile σ¯ is partially defined such that
〈σ¯〉v0 = hi,v0 ·(gi,v0)ω, and the non-empty prefixes h of hi,v0 ·(gi,v0)ω are all labeled with
γ(h) = (i, v0).
At the following steps, we consider a history h′v′ that is not yet labeled, but such that
h′ has already been labeled. By induction, γ(h′) = (j, v) and there exists hv ≤ h′ such that
16Set Pα(v′) must be non-empty.
17When some constants ci ∈ Ci are additionally given, play hi,v0 ·(gi,v0)ω must be replaced by any
lasso play in Pα∗(v0) ∩ {ρ in (G, v0) | λi(ρ) ≤ ci,∀i ∈ Π}.
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〈σ¯h〉v = hj,v ·(gj,v)ω. Suppose that Last(h′) ∈ Vi, the proof of Lemma 21 requires to choose
a play ρ′ ∈ Pα∗(v′) such that λi(h′ρ′) = λi(ρ′) ≥ λi(h·〈σ¯h〉v). We choose ρ′ = hi,v′ ·(gi,v′)ω
with maximal cost λi(ρ′) = Λi(Pα∗(v′)). Then we continue the construction of σ¯ such
that 〈σ¯h′〉v′ = hi,v′ ·(gi,v′)ω, and for all non-empty prefixes g of hi,v′ ·(gi,v′)ω, we define
γ(h′g) = (i, v′).
We know by Lemma 21 that σ¯ is an SPE. It is finite-memory because it only depends
on the finite number of lasso plays hj,v ·(gj,v)ω, and the labeling γ that can be computed
inductively as follows. Initially, γ(v0) = (i, v0) for some chosen i ∈ Π. Let h′ ∈ Histi and
suppose that γ(h′) = (j, v). If h′v′ respects hj,v ·(gj,v)ω, then γ(h′v′) = (j, v), otherwise
γ(h′v′) = (i, v′) (as explained in the previous paragraph). This establishes the second part
of Theorem 45. J
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this article, we have studied the existence of (weak) SPEs in quantitative games. We
have proposed a Folk Theorem for weak SPEs, and a weaker version for SPEs. To illustrate
the potential of this theorem, we have given two applications. The first one is concerned
with quantitative reachability games for which we have provided an algorithm to compute
a finite-memory SPE, and a second algorithm for deciding the constrained existence of a
(finite-memory) SPE. The second application is concerned with another large class of games
for which we have proved that the (constrained) existence of a (finite-memory) weak SPE is
decidable.
Future possible directions of research are the following ones. We would like to study the
complexities of the problems studied for the two classes of games. We also want to investigate
the application of our Folk Theorem to other classes of games. The example of Figure 3 is a
game with a weak SPE but no SPE (see Example 12). Recall that for this game, the cost
λi(ρ) can be seen as either the mean-payoff, or the liminf, or the limsup, of the weights of ρ.
We do not know if games with this kind of payoff functions always have a weak SPE or not.
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